SOCIAL FORCES
for it must provide insight and incentive
to maturity and to justice in addition to the
familiarity with pertinent facts gathered
from a wide area of science.
Another question frequently asked is,
"What value has the course had when
tested by later, actual marriage experience?"
Alumni attitude is indeed the proper test
of the functioning of a course in praparation for marriage, and now that I am ending ten years' teaching of undergradute
men to give all my time to graduate work,
aside from the class for women that I plan
continue to teach, and that over a thousand men and women have had the instruction, an effort will be made by Professor

Robert Beaty, of the University of Florida,
to find out how the marriage course has
funciioned. However, nothing so reveals
the strength of educational traditionalism
as the thought of some that any type of
instruction that attempts in a new and
practical way to grapple with the actual
problems of life needs such testing, and
their failure to recognize that courses that
are continued year after year, and often
required because they have in times past
been safely embedded in academic routine,
should receive the same scrutiny. It is in
this reaction that the ineffective, irresponsible and unintelligent aspects of the
college program come to the surface.
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to the citizens of sister states would seem
both obscene and astounding did not
familiarity blunt our capacity to react to
it. But although we can view the business with more aplomb than might be
manifested by the Man from Mars, migratory divorce-to employ the convenient
euphenism-still retains a hold upon the
interest not only of students of the family
and of the law and its processes but of the
public at large. Moreover, that familiarity with the existence and general characteristics of this peculiar institution may
* This paper was read before the Third Annual

Short Course in Conservation of Marriage and the
Family, held at the University of North Carolina,
July 5-9, 1937. Much of the material has been summarized from the issue on "Migratory Divorce" in
Law and ContemporaryProblems of which the author is
editor, and all references in the text and notes to Law
and Contemporary Problems are to this particular issue.

have served to deter inquiry into its particulars. It is on the assumption that this
may be true that I have undertaken to discuss some of the questions which migratory divorce poses: Why do people seek
such divorces and where? Is the migratory divorce decree valid and what are its
legal consequences? What possibility is
there of extirpating the traffic? What
appraisal should be placeed upon the
institution?
Each question deserves a monograph in
response; any attempt to discuss them all
within the confines of a single article is
open to the charge of superficiality. In
this predicament, I am obliged to seek the
refuge of all writers of all survey articles:
the hope that a little knowledge will whet
the reader's appetite for the more abundant
store that can be obtained from more comprehensive studies of the subject.
Before inquiring why people seek migratory divorces, perhaps it would be well to
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define that term-at least for the purposes
of this article. A migratory divorce is a
divorce granted to a person who has left
his home in one state and resorted temporarily to another state for the express
purpose of obtaining a divorce from its
courts. Strictly, of course, the term does
not include the divorces which the Mexican courts are happy to grant to applicants
by mail. The mail order divorce is an
exotic which presents many of the same
problems that are raised by the migratory
divorce and I shall not always have occasion to differentiate between them. It is,
however, important to differentiate between the migratory divorce and the
divorces granted to persons whose migration is not ephemeral. Not infrequently,
following the de facto dissolution of a
marriage, one or the other spouse will
leave the home state to establish a home
elsewhere, possibly to seek a livelihood or
perhaps merely to "go back to Mother."
Later this spouse seeks a divorce in the
state to which he or she has repaired.
Probably the most difficult legal questions
are presented by precisely such cases.
I
It is largely a matter of common knowledge why people migrate for divorce. The
principal reason, of course, is the fact that
the states to which they go provide less
exacting grounds for the granting of
decrees than do the home states from
which the migrants come. For this reason New York with its strict divorce law
furnishes a large supply of grist to the
divorce mills. South Carolinians keep the
Georgia courts busy. The county in
which Augusta is situated exports marriages and imports divorces and, as a consequence, has had the highest ratio of divorces
to marriages of any county in the nation.'
1 U. S. Bureau of the Census, sith Annual Report
on Marriage and Divorce (1934) Table x5. See also

Another reason for migration is that the
divorce mills will often grant decrees more
promptly than the courts of the home
state will grant them on the same grounds.
This feature appeals to those restive
spouses for whom time may be of the
essence. Another attraction of the migratory divorce is that it leads to less publicity in the home town press. It may be
doubted, however, whether the Reno
divorce court operates much more mechanically than do the divorce courts of
those states which do not cater to divorce
migrants.
Some people, I suspect, go to the divorce
mill because it is becoming to be regarded
as the thing to do. In the days when the
Paris divorce mill flourished, a French
decree was regarded as having a certain
social cachet. Still other persons may
migrate simply because newspaper publicity has familiarized them with the fact
that divorces can be obtained in the
divorce mills, and they are reluctant to
consult local lawyers to learn their legal
rights in their home states. Not long ago
a photograph was taken at a Nevada
"dude ranch" of a group of paying guests
who were awaiting their divorces. This
picture, with an informative caption, was
widely published in the newspapers. A
guest at the ranch told me that subsequently the ranch owner, a woman, was
flooded with letters from women in all
parts of the country, inquiring how they
might secure divorces in Nevada. This
episode is a commentary, and a sorry one,
on the degree of confidence with which
lawyers are regarded, at least by the poor
and ignorant, in their own communities.
Brearley, "A Note Upon Migratory Divorce of South
Carolinians," 2 Law and Contemporary Problems 329,
337. (June, 1935). Washoe County, Nevada, in
which Reno is located, does a thriving trade in
marriages as well as divorces; hence its ratio is lower
than that of Richmond County, Georgia.
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Yet economy is not one of the attractions which the divorce mill offers. Even
a mail order divorce will cost more than a
divorce obtained in the home town. The
usual rate charged for a Mexican decree is
$a25 . If, however, you do not apply for
a divorce at that rate, some of the soliciting offices will write to inform you that
the large volume of business has made it
possible for them to offer you the special
reduced rate of $ioo.2
Despite its enterprising competitors,
Reno is still the center of the migratory
divorce industry. Nevada ousted the
Dakotas as the principal source of easy
divorce early in this century. For many
years, it was necessary to reside in Nevada
for six months before suit could be instituted. In 1931, however, Arkansas endeavored to wrest from Nevada its primacy
by enacting a law requiring only 9o days
residence. Fearing the competing attractions of Hot Springs, the Reno divorce
lawyers and hotel proprietors hurried a bill
through the Nevada legislature reducing
the residence period in that state to six
weeks. Idaho also adopted a 9o-day law
in '931. But Idaho has not been a significant figure in the competition for the divorce business. The creation of a luxurious winter resort in Idaho, announced
with much fanfare this year, will doubtless
attract many who prefer winter sports to
sun bathing or dude ranching as the anaesthetic for their marital operations.
In 1935 Florida adopted a 9o-day law,
and evidently Florida competition is be2

See Bergeson, "The Divorce Mill Advertises,"

2.

Law and Contemporary Problemi 348, 351 (June, 1935).

If a case is forwarded by a local lawyer, the fee
charged by the Texas correspondent is usually $8o, the
local attorney charging as much more as the traffic
will bear. Mexican law offices in New York City
charge $2S5 , payable in installments, the final installment being payable "'upon the tendering of the certified copy of the final decree of divorce duly translated
into English." Ibid.

ginning to be felt seriously in Nevada.
During the past session of the Nevada
legislature, a bill was considered which
would reduce the residence period from six
weeks to three. The lawyers would not
suffer from such a change but the hotel
proprietors would. Evidently the latter
was the stronger group, for the bill did
not become a law.
Both Havana, Cuba, and Yucatan,
Mexico, have sought to attract some of
the migratory divorce business, but suffer
under the handicap of high transportation
costs. The Mexican border states have
specialized in the granting of mail order
decrees-with the hearty co6peration of
certain American lawyers (chiefly in
Texas) who solicit the business from their
compatriots (lawyers and laymen alike) by
circulars and newspaper advertisements
and turn the litigation over to Mexican
correspondents. During the 'twenties,
the wealthy sought French divorces, but a
housecleaning in the Paris bar proved fatal
to the business.
II
Strictly, the legal difficulty which the
migratory divorce presents does not lie in
the evasion of the more stringent divorce
laws of the home state. If the migratory
divorce decree were granted by a court
having jurisdiction, the fact that it resulted in such an evasion of the laws of the
home state would not affect its legality.
Under the full faith and credit clause of
the United States Constitution, 3 the home
state would be obliged to recognize and
give effect to such a decree. The difficulty
arises from the fact that the decrees granted
are not valid, and hence not entitled to
recognition, because the courts which
grant them lack jurisdiction.
The term "jurisdiction" is more often
3U.

S. Constitution, Art. IV, Section i.
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used than understood. With lawyerly
caution, I shall refrain from defining it.
Instead I shall proceed in the law teacher's
fashion by resorting to hypothetical cases.
Suppose a man in California owes you
$ioo. So long as he stays there, and will
not consent to the institution of the action,
you cannot obtain a judgment against him
on that claim in North Carolina. The
court will hold that your action is in
personam-against the person-and that
the court lacks personal jurisdiction over
the defendant since he was not served with
process in this state. However, if your
debtor were so bold as to come to this
state, you could have process served upon
him during his stay here, and, even though
he were to leave the state immediately
after, that would not affect the court's
personal jurisdiction over him or the
validity of the judgment it might ultimately enter. On a personal claim of this
nature, you can sue a defendant wherever
you can catch him. Moreover, he can
consent to be sued in advance of the institution of the action or even after it has
begun, and, in such case, the judgment will
be valid even though no process was served
in the state.
Suppose, however, that you and Mr. A
of Hollywood, California, own land in
North Carolina in common. Suppose that
you wish to have this land partitioned in a
judicial proceeding. You could institute
the partition proceeding in a North Carolina court, and it would be carried throngh
even though Mr. A were never to consent
to the action nor to leave California.
Such a proceeding is said to be in remagainst the thing. Personal service is not
required even though it is Mr. A's interest
in the thing rather than the thing itself that
is actually affected by the decree. If the
land in question were in California rather
than in North Carolina, you could not
obtain the partition decree in North Caro-

lina even though Mr. A were present here
and were to consent to the institution of
the proceeding. In such a situation it
would be said that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action. The proceeding being in remagainst a thing-that thing must be
within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.
Now let us consider a divorce action and
assume that Mr. and Mrs. A of North
Carolina have fallen out and wish a divorce more promptly than North Carolina
will provide it on the grounds available.
Courts proceed by analogy in developing
the law. Should they follow the analogy
to the personal action and permit the divorce to be brought wherever Mr. A lets
Mrs. A's process server catch him? The
courts have decided against such a policy.
They hold that the interest of the home
state in the marriage relationship is so
great that the mere presence or consent of
the parties is not sufficient to give any
other court before whom they may appear
jurisdiction to dissolve this relationship.
Instead, the courts have followed the
analogy to the action in rem. They have
treated the marriage relationship as a
thing, and have insisted that this thing be
properly before the court. If the court
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action, then, still following the
analogy, the courts do not require that the
defendant be personally served or consent
to the action. Service by publishing a
notice of the action will suffice.
This is not the first time that judges have
thingified a concept. Reification, to use a
more elegant word, is an intellectual tool
that is often abused-and not alone in law
-because its metaphorical character is not
always realized. In the law of divorce
jurisdiction, it has led the courts to focus
their inquiry upon the question where this
thing, the marriage relation, is located.
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The point at which the courts have
decided that the marriage relation is
4
located is the domicil of the spouses.
Consequently, only the court of the domicil can give a valid decree of divorce.
Personal service, appearance, or consent
of the defendant will not validate the
decree of any other court. Hence it is
important to inquire where one's domicil
is in the eyes of the law.
"Domicil" is one of the numerous chameleon terms of the law which take their
color from the legal questions in which
they are employed, and, since a determination of domicil is involved in a variety of
legal issues, its definition is peculiarly
treacherous. In contemplation of law,
every person has a domicil and, at any
given time, only one domicil. One's
father's domicil is conferred upon one at
birth; one retains this domicil until, after
attaining majority, one achieves a "domicil of choice." This is effected by the
coincidence of physical presence within a
state with the intention to remain there
indefinitely, in other words, to establish a
home. One who goes to a place with a
view to spending a limited period of time
there, even though he may have no intention of returning to his previous home,
does not thereby become domiciled at that
place. He is a resident there but not a
domiciliary.
It is evident that any doctrine which
rests so heavily upon a person's intent
must be elusive and uncertain in application, and so it has proved with domicil.
No doubt it was partly to assure adequate
proof of domicil that plaintiffs have been
required by most divorce statutes to have
4In civil law countries, it is true, the nation of
which the spouses were citizens or subjects was
chosen as the situs of the marriage relationship. This
choice, however, could not be satisfactorily applied
to a federal nation such as the United States or the
British Commonwealth of Nations since in such a
nation the problem is to determine where, within
the federation, is the seat of the marriage relationship.

resided one or more years within the state
before instituting divorce actions. In the
divorce mills, these time limits are retained
in drastically truncated form, but no
genuine effort is made to prove domicil. 5
The function of the residence requirement
in such states is no longer legal but economic. It does not guard against the
simulation of domicil; it merely assures the
hotel proprietors of a minimum of trade.
The courts have distinguished motive
from intent and have held that the mere
fact that one migrated to another state for
the purpose of obtaining a divorce there
would not preclude him from obtaining a
domicil if his intent was to establish a
permanent home in the jurisdiction to
which he had gone.6 However, it is evident that the seeker after migratory divorces who spends 43 days in Reno with
the intention of packing up and departing
as soon as the necessary document is obtained is not domiciled there. He has
complied with the statutory requirements
as to residence; he has perjured himself
before an acquiescent bench and bar to
establish color of domicil; but he has not
obtained a decree which will withstand
attack in another state. There the fact
that the Nevada domicil was simulated
can be proved by the other spouse; it is a
fact upon which the Nevada court's juris5 In Nevada, the legislature seemingly endeavored
to dispense with the requirement of domicil by an
amendment to the Nevada statute in 1915, but the
State Supreme Court by an interpretative tour de force
continued to find the requirement in the statute.
Walker v. Walker, 45 Nev. io5, 198 Pac. 433 (192z1).
If this interpretation had not been made, the Nevada
statute might have been held unconstitutional as
contravening the due process clause of the 14 th
Amendment. Interpreted to require domicil, the
statute itself becomes invulnerable. Lip service is
accorded its requirements in the Nevada divorce
courts, while in substance they are disregarded. See
Ingram and Ballard, "The Business of Migratory
Divorce in Nevada," 3 Law and Contemporary Problems
301, 305 (June, 193s).
' Williams v. Osenton, 2-32. U. S. 619 (1913).
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diction to grant the decree depended and
"jurisdictional facts" are open to question
in the courts of sister states. Finding the
Nevada court lacked jurisdiction, the
court of the second state will rule the
Nevada decree void. Needless to say, a
mail order decree is subject to the same
treatment, the principal difference being
that proof of its invalidity is simpler. I
A decree of a court lacking jurisdiction
is said to be a nullity. Let us see some of
the consequences which result from that
proposition. Suppose Mrs. A returns from
Reno to North Carolina. Upon her arrival her husband sues her for divorce.
Her Nevada decree divorcing him would be
no protection to her. Suppose, instead,
Mrs. A after her divorce were to die and
Mr. A were to claim a share in her estate as
her husband. Here again Mr. A would be
successful. Suppose, next, that Mrs. A
marries B in North Carolina and an indignant solicitor prosecutes her for adulterous
cohabitation. The prosecution will lie.
Suppose, again that Mrs. A marries B but
her new husband abandons her. She
brings suit against him for non-support.
He will have a perfectly good defense on
the ground that she is still married to Mr.
A. Suppose a still further unpleasantness
-TMrs.
A marries B and has children.
Their legitimacy will be subject to question. 8 So, too, will the legitimacy of
Mr. A's children should he marry C in
The plaintiff not having been physically present
in the jurisdiction granting the decree, lack of domicil
can be proved by reference to this factor alone and no
inquiry need be made as to intent. Interestingly
enough, the mail order decrees of the Mexican State
Courts are of doubtful validity in Mexico itself.
The Federal Supreme Court has several times ruled
against them. See Summers, "The Divorce Laws of
Mexico," 3 Law and Contemporary Problems 3o,
316 (June, 1935).
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8 In a number of states, statutes provide that the
children of void marriages are legitimate. In such
states, of course, the invalidity of a parent's divorce
decree would not affect the status of children born of
a subsequent marriage by that parent.

reliance upon Mrs. A's divorce. All these
results are consistent with the theory of
the nullity of the void divorce. Why,
then, do people persist in getting the void
decrees?
The obvious and, I think, sufficient
answer is that however such decrees may
be regarded by the courts, they are not
regarded as social nullities. The status of
the person who marries after obtaining
such a decree from a divorce mill is obviously far superior socially to that of a
person who, dispensing with all legal
formalities, merely commences to cohabit
with another person. Moreover, paradoxical as it may seem, a void decree of
divorce has significant legal consequences.
Suppose our Mrs. A, after her return to
North Carolina, repents and sues Mr. A
for non-support. Although her divorce
decree would be a nullity in an action
brought by Mr. A, nevertheless, the court
of any state will hold that the decree obtaified by Mrs. A will preclude her from
asserting her marital rights against Mr. A.
The decree, the court will solemnly announce, is null and void, but Mrs. A, by
reason of having sought that decree, is
estopped-will not be heard-to assert
herself as Mr. A's wife. Suppose again
that Mr. A, learning of Mrs. A's trip to
Reno, heaves a sigh of relief and proceeds
to wed a California girl. Later, after a
second divorce, Mr. A seeks to succeed to
the right of a husband in the first Mrs. A's
property. In that event he will find himself estopped. Having married upon the
strength of the invalid decree, he will
not be heard subsequently to attack its
validity.9
Some decisions suggest that one who
merely files a formal answer in a divorce
I For a discussion of the doctrine of estoppel, see
Harper, "The Validity of Void Decrees," 79 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. x58 (1930); Harper, "The Myth of the Void
Divorce," 2 Law and Contemporary Problems 335 (June,
'935)-
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action brought at a divorce mill will by
that fact become estopped to contest later
the validity of the decree. If this doctrine
should become well-established, it will
have a very significant effect. Over half
the divorces obtained in Reno are obtained
after formal answer has been filed, a percentage far higher than will be found in
any other jurisdiction. These formal contests accelerate the granting of the decrees,
but they do not add to their validity.
But if the mere filing of an answer may
serve to operate as an estoppel, then both
parties will be precluded from attacking
the decree, and, except insofar as rights of
third parties are concerned, that legal
nullity, the void decree, will be pragmatically valid.
One of the favorite devices of lawyers
whose clients wish a speedy divorce is to
have the spouses enter into a separation
agreement and a property settlement preceding the flight to Reno of one of them.
The settlement and the doctrine of estoppel
combine to render unlikely any further
litigation. I should add incidentally that
for the granting of a decree for alimony it
is essential that the court have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant spouse.
As I pointed out earlier in this paper,
many divorce decrees are granted to migrant spouses whose purpose in migrating
was not merely to obtain a divorce but to
obtain a home in another state. Here the
problem becomes difficult for the spouses
may have different domicils. The convenient device of treating the marriage relation as a thing and locating that thing in
the state of the domicil becomes awkward
when two domicils are involved. Courts
given to the unwitting practice of reification have strived manfully in the effort
to locate this concept in one domicil or the
other; some have followed the Pudd'nhead
Wilson technique of dividing the relation
between the two states and allowing either

state to shoot its half of the dog. Analysis of the relevant decisions would call for
a paper twice the length of this and would
serve only to demonstrate that the law on
the point is both uncertain and unsatisfactory.'" A brief reference to some of the
problems may suffice to indicate why a
spouse may be married in one state while
divorced in another.
A complicating factor in this situation
is the rule of law regarding the domicil of
a married woman. The common law rule,
still followed in England, was that a wife's
domicil was always the same as her husband's. Almost a century ago, however,
American courts decided that a wife could
obtain a separate domicil where her husband's conduct justified her in leaving him."
Thus, where a husband is guilty of cruelty,
the wife can obtain a domicil of her own
and sue him there for divorce. But
later, when she seeks to rely on that decree
in subsequent litigation with him, he may
assert that he was not in fact the wrongdoer and that his conduct did not justify
her departure. If her domicil depends on
his wrongful conduct, then that conduct
becomes a fact on which the court's jurisdiction depends. Unless the husband was
at fault, the wife did not acquire an independent domicil and hence the court had
no jurisdiction to grant a decree at her
suit. If, upon examining the "jurisdictional facts," the second court refuses to
accept the finding of the first court with
respect to the husband's alleged fault, then
the wife has no recourse but to appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States,
10Leading law review articles on the subject are
Beale, "Haddock Revisited," 39 HarvardL. Rev. 417
(192.6); McClintock, "Fault as an Element of Divorce
Jurisdiction," 37 Yale L. J. 564 (1918); Bingham,
"Matter of Haddock v. Haddock," 21 Cornell L. Q.
393 (!936).
11The leading case recognizing the wife's power to
obtain a separate domicil is Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I.
87 (1856).
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asserting that the court of the second state
has failed to respect the full faith and
credit clause by failing to reach a proper
conclusion with respect to the jurisdictional fact involved in the first action.
Obviously the Supreme Court is a fantastic
forum for the determination of such an
issue.
It should be noted that there is no difficulty in a husband's obtaining a new domicil independently of a wife who refuses to
follow him. Suppose a husband moves to
Connecticut, leaving a wife behind him in
New York. Later he obtains a divorce
from her in Connecticut. Subsequently,
she sues him for divorce in New York.
Is the New York court obliged to respect
the Connecticut decree and dismiss the
wife's suit? This was the question raised
before the Supreme Court of the United
States in the famous case of Haddock v.
Haddock, decided in 19o6.12 The Supreme
Court held in the Haddock case that the
divorce decree obtained by the husband in
Connecticut was not entitled to full faith
and credit in New York. The Supreme
Court accepted the finding of the New
York court, contrary to that of the Connecticut court, that the husband had been
at fault and that the wife's domicil did not
follow his to Connecticut. As a consequence of this decision, the validity of a
decree obtained by a husband who migrates to a new home without his wife is as
uncertain as the decree obtained by the
wife who does likewise. Uncertain, that
is, in any state other than the state which
rendered the decree; in that state the
validity of the decree is unquestioned. 3
U. S. 567 (19o6).
13Since the plaintiff is a citizen of the state in

It should be said, however, that many
states are willing to recognize by comity
the decrees of other states even where
recognition is not compelled by the full
faith and credit clause. Nevertheless,
those states which, like New York, will
act only under constitutional compulsion
are the states which tend to be strictest in
their requirements for divorce and therefore
are the states from which migration most
frequently occurs. The result is that
where the remedial operation of the doctrine of comity could do the most good it is
not applied.
Even though jurisdictional requirements
are satisfied, the divorce granted by a court
before whom only one spouse is present
opens up a possibility of injustice which is
very real. In such cases the statutory
requirement for the institution of the action can be usually satisfied by giving
notice of the pending action by publication
in the legal advertising columns of newspapers, an almost certain guaranty that the
information will not come to the attention
of the person to whom it is directed.
Actual notice of the pending action therefore depends on the decency of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff desires to inform the
absent spouse, he or she may do so, except
where the latter's whereabouts actually
are unknown. But in many cases of hostility, this will not be done. As a result,
a matter vitally affecting the absent party
may be disposed of in an ex parte action.
Studies conducted by the Institute of
Law at Johns Hopkins of the operation of
the Maryland and Ohio divorce courts
show that this situation is far from infre-

122.o

which he is domiciled, that state is said to have the
right to determine his status even though its decree
need not be recognized by the state of which the other
party to the status is a citizen. Another anomaly of
the Haddock case is its recognition of the validity of
decrees granted at the domicil of one of the spouses

where the other spouse was served with process within
that state. 2.o U. S. at 570. Where the plaintiff
spouse has remained in the state where the parties were
domiciled together as man and wife (the "matrimonial domicil"), the decree of the court in that
state will be entitled to recognition under the full
faith and credit clause. Id at 569.
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quent. 14 In fact, cases of divorce without any knowledge of the proceeding by
one party are far more numerous, if less
publicized, than the true migratory divorces. 5 It is difficult to see how this
problem can be met without resort to some
new machinery in our courts. Such machinery has in fact been developed in
Detroit. The Detroit courts were resorted
to by a large number of alien workers who
had left wives abroad and had come to
Detroit in search of employment. Absense did not make the heart grow fonder,
especially when it had to overcome immigration barriers and steamship fares. The
number of ex parte divorces sought by these
workers grew so large that a new office,
called the "Friend of the Court," was created as an adjunct to the Detroit divorce
court. In cases of this character the
Friend of the Court, working in co6peration with the International Migration
Service, a philanthropic society, intervened in the proceeding and secured a stay
until an opportunity had been granted for
the Service to investigate the status of the
absent wife. Frequently, it was found
that she had no knowledge of her husband's intentions, and, quite possibly, if
they had been carried out, she would have
remained in ignorance. The intervention
of these agencies does not always result in
denial of the divorces sought, but it does
assure proper notice and the making of
proper arrangements for the support of
the divorced wives.1
14 The whereabouts of the defendant were unknown
in 15.6 per cent of the divorce actions instituted in
Ohio. Marshall and May, The Divorce Court--Ohio

(1933) 67-73.
15Migratory divorces are estimated at about 3
per cent of all divorces. Cahen, Statistical Analysis
of American Divorce (s32) 78.
16For a discussion of the Detroit procedure, see

III
The Detroit experiment is not typical
of efforts to cope with the migratory divorce problem. Regarded as an unmitigated evil, migratory divorce has long
been the target of reformers, but they have
sought its extirpation rather than the
prevention of injuries incidental to it. In
the i88o's, agitation for federal action
gave rise to a federal investigation which,
typically, produced no results. In i9o5 ,
President Theodore Roosevelt called a
conference of Governors to study uniform
state laws on the subject. The conference
was equally unproductive. The Haddock
case in 19o6 was the culmination of a series
of cases in which the Supreme Court of the
United States made clear its disapproval of,
if not the law applicable to, the institution. Beginning about 1gio,
agitation
for a constitutional amendment authorizing Congress to enact a federal divorce law
was pressed, but, aside from the perennial
introduction in Congress of resolutions to
that end, this movement has been barren. 17
The Commissioners for Uniform State
Laws drafted a Uniform Divorce Act and,
when that was ignored by virtually all
states, drew up a Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act, aimed directly at migratory
divorce. Vermont alone adopted the latter act, and then, at its next legislative
session, repealed the measure.
On the basis of this experience, I think
it may be safely predicted that we shall
not solve this problem either by uniform
state action or by federal action. There is
no more likelihood of Nevada's abandoning its lax divorce practices than there is
of Delaware's tightening up its corporation laws. Such action would be at great
economic sacrifice. Moreover, there is no

Wainhouse, "Protecting the Absent Spouse in International Divorce: The Detroit Experinment," 2 Law

1 For a depiction of the movements for uniform
state or federal divorce legislation, see Lichtenberger,

and Contemporary Problems 360 (June, 1935).

Divorce (1931) C.VIII.
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conviction of sin to inspire it. Doubtless
most Nevada citizens are convinced that
they are doing a service to the nation in
providing a place of escape for the matrimonially burdened.
Can the courts or legislatures of the
states from which the migrants come do
anything to stop the business? The courts
have pronounced the migratory decrees
invalid without deterring resort to the
divorce mills. True, they have taken
back much that they have said by developing the doctrine of estoppel. But the
abandonment of the doctrine of estoppel
would give sanction to judicial dislike of
migratory divorce at the cost of actively
aiding and abetting flagrant injustices.
The courts have granted injunctions at
the suit of deserted wives, ordering husbands not to apply for divorces elsewhere.
The courts have also granted declaratory
judgments at the suit of wives whose husbands have already divorced them elsewhere, the judgments declaring the plaintiffs still to be the lawful wives of the
defendant husbands. From a practical
standpoint, it is open to doubt just how
useful these remedies are."8 Moreover,
they will never be invoked where the
divorce is an amicable one, and such it is
in the majority of migratory cases.
The state's power to prosecute for
bigamy' 9 or adulterous cohabitation the
is The injunction is of consequence as a deterrent
only if the erring spouse wishes to return to his home
state. The declaratory judgment may serve to clarify
the status of the plaintiff spouse and aid in the future
assertion of claims to property. The law relating to
these remedies is treated fully in Jacobs, "The Utility
of Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Migratory Divorce," 2. Law and Contemporary Problems 370
(June, 1935).
19By marrying in the state granting the divorce,
the divorced spouse will avoid the commission of
bigamy as that offense is normally defined, since it is
the act of contracting the marriage which constitutes
the crime and, ex bypothesi, the second marriage would
be legal where contracted. However, some state-

husband or wife who marries after a
migratory divorce exists unimpaired by
the doctrine of estoppel. Occasionally
where the guilty spouse has succeeded in
outraging public opinion in his home town
and is pursued by a vindictive wife, the
prosecutor will act. Actuarial studies
would, I suspect, reveal the risk of such
prosecution to be slightly less than the
danger of death by lightning.' Suppose a
local Savonarola became district attorney
and brought action in every such case. I
think the refusal of juries to convict would
discourage him before the electorate had
a chance to vote him out of office.
It is such considerations which cast an
air of unreality over any speculation as to
what the legislatures of the home states
might do to penalize the divorce migrant.
Any such measure as might be devised
would require the support of a determined
and an indignant public. This simply
doesn't exist today. Reno inspires far
more jests than jeremiads.
Perhaps a qualification might be made
as to the mail order divorce. The mail
order divorce lacks most of the color of
legality which inheres in a Nevada decree.
Moreover, it is obvious that the judicial
machinery provided by the domestic
divorce mills, however well-oiled and
geared for mass production it may be, can,
if properly invoked, operate to prevent
gross injustice. No such assurance exists
in the case of the mail order divorce.
Finally, the mail order divorce traffic is
the product of persistent solicitation of
business by Mexican and American lawyers, directed chiefly to the ignorant and
the poor. In many instances, I have no
define bigamy to include the act of cohabitation
following the second marriage and, in such states,
assuming the divorce to be invalid, a prosecution for
bigamy would be sustained. In most other states,
prosecution could be instituted for the lesser offense
of adulterous cohabitation.
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doubt that poor people are persuaded to
pay more for invalid Mexican decrees
than they would have had to pay for valid
decrees in their home courts. The only
mitigating circumstance is that in those
states where decrees can be obtained on
only one or a few restricted grounds, the
mail order decree does equalize the position of the poor who cannot afford the
trip to the divorce mill with the position
of the well-to-do who can.
Assuming that the mail order divorce
traffic should be stamped out, the task is
a practicable one. The Federal Government in the exercise of its power over the
mails and other forms of interstate and
foreign communication could deal quite
effectively with the traffic. Already, I
understand, a committee of the New York
bar has been working for federal legislation to this end.
The prospects are that we shall live with
the migratory divorce traffic for some years
to come. I see only one sure method of
eliminating it, and that is through a
change in the divorce laws of those states
which now supply the grist for the divorce
mills. Given an opportunity for relatively simple, dignified divorce proceedings at home, the number who would
migrate for divorce would not be large.
Once the number of divorce seekers had
fallen to a low level, even the divorce
mills might decide that the business did
not pay sufficient dividends to justify
continued lack of legal respectability.
But many years must elapse before this
situation comes about. In the meantime,
we have the migratory divorce. How
shall we appraise it?

IV
Of course, to the persons to whom all
divorce is evil, any means of facilitating divorce will be condemned. They
can, however, obtain some comfort
from the fact that reliable estimates

have placed the volume of migratory
divorces no higher than 3 per cent of all
divorces."s The opening of new divorce
mills since these estimates were made and
the augmented mail order traffic have perhaps increased this percentage. Yet certainly 5 per cent would still be a liberal
estimate.
Impossible to calculate but nonetheless
significant is the influence which these
widely-publicized divorce centers have had
on resort to divorce without resort to
migration. My guess would be that Reno
has caused many more divorces than its
courts have granted.
Suppose, however, that one looks at the
institution of divorce with a more tolerant
attitude. Are the characteristics of migratory divorce such that it should nonetheless be singled out for condemnation? I
have already pointed to some of the legal
defects which inhere in the migratory
decree. Yet I do not think that one is
justified in viewing the situation thus created with alarm. So far as the law reports
evidence, the number of instances in which
these defects have actually caused trouble
is small, however distressing that trouble
may be when it arises.21
That the mechanical ex parte procedure
20

See Cahen, loc. cit supra note 15.

21It might be supposed that the legitimacy of
children would be the source of considerable litigation arising out of the migratory divorces of their
parents. In the thirty-year period ending in 5935,
less than half a dozen cases of this character seem to
have been reported in the American Digest System
covering all the reported decisions (chiefly of appellate courts but including courts of first instance in
New York State) during the period. While cases involving other issues are more numerous, the number
under no heading is large. Perhaps, since property
disputes are the principal inspiration of litigation, we
must wait until the principals in migratory divorces
have had an opportunity to grow old and die before
we shall find a volume of cases commensurate with
the potential legal troubles that migratory divorce
breeds. I am skeptical, however, that a marked increase will be noted; after all, there were migratory
divorces aplenty at the turn of the century.

THE FAMILY
followed in the divorce mills may result
in injustices and hardships in individual
cases is certainly not to be disputed.
However, the number, and I suspect even
the proportion, of such cases is probably
smaller than that of the cases of hardship
and injustice arising in ex parte nonmigratory cases. There are divorce mills
aplenty outside Nevada, Arkansas, and
Florida, even though their grist is solely of
domestic origin.
One aspect of the migratory divorce
problem is not often discussed but is I
think worthy of consideration. The laws
relating to divorce are obviously an important part of the legal structure of society.
How healthy for that society is it that
those laws can be evaded by the thinnest
sort of legal subterfuge? If such evasion
may not harm the family, still what does
it do to the law? The problem is accentuated by the fact that, by and large, this
evasion is possible only for the well-to-do.
I think there is cause here for concern,
but not for great anxiety. Viewed in its
relation to the-problem of law's functioning in society, the phenomenon of migratory divorce is but one of a great many
instances where the law is called upon to
play a dual r6le. On the one hand, it is
required to preserve a symbol cherished by
a people; on the other hand, it is required
to furnish a means of preventing that symbol from standing too much in the way of

the desires and practices of everyday life.2 2
The symbol of the united family, joined by
God and dissoluble by man only in extreme
cases, has long been part and parcel of
American ideology. But changing ways
of life have made fidelity to that symbol
increasingly inconvenient. The symbol is
not destroyed; instead, it is carefully preserved and lawyers and judges are called
upon to exercise their wits to evade it.
Migratory divorce is one of their solutions.It is distinguished from other instances of
the same process in this and other fields of
the law only in that the geographical
division of the symbolic and practical functions renders the dualism too obvious to
be ignored.
There is one question which I believe
should be posed to himself by every person
who thinks about migratory divorce, for,
while he cannot well answer it, its exploration will carry him close to the nub
of the problem. The question is this:
What would happen, over a period of
years, if tomorrow the divorce mills of
Nevada and its rival sister states were to
close, and no other states were to carry on
23
the migratory divorce business?
2 For a stimulating discussion of the relation of
law and symbol, see Arnold, Symbols of Government

(-935).

23Professor Ernest R. Groves' penetrating article,
"Migratory Divorces," 2 Law and Contemporary Probems 2-93 (June, 1935), is recommended to those who
wish to pursue further the sociological implications
of the institution.

